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Full Idea
I'm inclined to accept that in certain contexts the standards for knowledge are so low that little more than true belief is required.
Gist of Idea
In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief.
Source
Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.6)
Book Ref
DeRose,Keith: 'The Case for Contextualism' [OUP 2009], p.14
A Reaction
DeRose emphasises that 'a little more' is needed, rather than none. The example given is where 'he knew that p' means little more than 'the information that p was available to him' (in a political scandal).
| 19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
| 19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
| 19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
| 19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
| 19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
| 19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |