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Single Idea 19514

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism ]

Full Idea

The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.

Gist of Idea

Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards

Source

Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)

Book Ref

DeRose,Keith: 'The Case for Contextualism' [OUP 2009], p.27


A Reaction

That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [defence of context as vital to knowledge claims]:

Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]