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Full Idea
The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.
Gist of Idea
Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards
Source
Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)
Book Ref
DeRose,Keith: 'The Case for Contextualism' [OUP 2009], p.27
A Reaction
That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.
19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |