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Single Idea 19521
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
]
Full Idea
Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable.
Gist of Idea
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
Source
Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting')
Book Ref
Conee,E/Feldman,R: 'Evidentialism' [OUP 2004], p.20
A Reaction
See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[objections to reliabilist justification]:
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22326
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Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate
[Russell]
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4259
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External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
[Bonjour]
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2866
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A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion
[Blackburn]
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8890
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If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible
[Bonjour]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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2737
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'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
[Audi,R]
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9162
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Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
[Field,H]
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20187
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Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
[Zagzebski]
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19522
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More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
[Conee]
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19521
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If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
[Conee]
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19523
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Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
[Conee]
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22327
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Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process
[Potter]
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19725
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In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified?
[Comesaņa]
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19726
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How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable?
[Comesaņa]
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19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe
[Kvanvig]
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