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Single Idea 19522

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism ]

Full Idea

Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability.

Gist of Idea

More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable

Source

Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles')

Book Ref

Conee,E/Feldman,R: 'Evidentialism' [OUP 2004], p.27


A Reaction

That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism?


The 9 ideas from Earl Conee

People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]