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Full Idea
When I ask myself what I am acquainted with, the physical objects in front of me are far more natural candidates than their appearances.
Gist of Idea
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances?
Source
Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.3)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.3
A Reaction
Not very impressive. The word 'acquainted' means the content of the experience, not the phenomena. Do I 'experience' the objects, or the appearances? The answer there is less obvious. If you apply it to colours, it is even less obvious.
Related Idea
Idea 19527 We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |