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Full Idea
When we acquire new evidence in perception, we do not first acquire unknown evidence and then somehow base knowledge on it later. Rather, acquiring new is evidence IS acquiring new knowledge.
Gist of Idea
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge
Source
Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.4)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.4
A Reaction
This makes his point much better than Idea 19526 does.
Related Ideas
Idea 19526 Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
Idea 19536 Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |