more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 19528

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First ]

Full Idea

Knowing corresponds to doing, believing to trying. Just as trying is naturally understood in relation to doing, so believing is naturally understood in relation to knowing.

Gist of Idea

Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do

Source

Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.4)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.4


A Reaction

An interesting analogy. You might infer that there can be no concept of 'belief' without the concept of 'knowledge', but we could say that it is 'truth' which is indispensible, and leave out knowledge entirely. Belief is to truth as trying is to doing?

Related Idea

Idea 16598 Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [knowledge is a basic concept, not to be analysed]:

A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]