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Single Idea 19530

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First ]

Full Idea

A neutral state covering both perceiving and misperceiving (or remembering and misrembering) is not somehow more basic than perceiving, for what unifies the case of each neutral state is their relation to the successful state.

Gist of Idea

A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic

Source

Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.5-6)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.5


A Reaction

An alternative is Disjunctivism, which denies the existence of a single neutral state, so that there is nothing to unite the two states, and they don't have a dependence relation. Why can't there be a prior family of appearances, some of them successful?


The 11 ideas with the same theme [knowledge is a basic concept, not to be analysed]:

A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]