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Single Idea 19531

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First ]

Full Idea

A postulated underlying layer of narrow mental states is a myth, whose plausibility derives from a comfortingly familiar but obsolescent philosophy of mind. Knowledge-first epistemology is a further step in the development of externalism.

Gist of Idea

Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism

Source

Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.6)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.6


A Reaction

Williamson is a real bruiser, isn't he? I don't take internalism about mind to be obsolescent at all, but now I feel so inferior for clinging to such an 'obsolescent' belief. ...But then I cling to Aristotle, who is (no doubt) an obsolete philosopher.

Related Idea

Idea 6641 Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]


The 11 ideas from 'Knowledge First (and reply)'

Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]