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Full Idea
Truth-conditional referential semantics is an externalist programme. In a context of utterance the atomic expressions of a language refer to worldly items, from which the truth-conditions of sentences are compositionally determined.
Gist of Idea
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items
Source
Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.6)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.6
A Reaction
I just don't see how a physical object can be part of the contents of a sentence. 'Dragons fly' is atomic, and meaningful, but its reference fails. 'The cat is asleep' is just words - it doesn't contain a live animal.
| 6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
| 14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
| 9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
| 9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
| 14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |