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Full Idea
Truth-conditional referential semantics is an externalist programme. In a context of utterance the atomic expressions of a language refer to worldly items, from which the truth-conditions of sentences are compositionally determined.
Gist of Idea
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items
Source
Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.6)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.6
A Reaction
I just don't see how a physical object can be part of the contents of a sentence. 'Dragons fly' is atomic, and meaningful, but its reference fails. 'The cat is asleep' is just words - it doesn't contain a live animal.
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |