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Full Idea
On internalist inferential (or conceptual role) semantics, the inferential relations of an expression do not depend on what, if anything, it refers to, ...rather, the meaning is something like its place in a web of inferential relations.
Gist of Idea
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references
Source
Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.6)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.6
A Reaction
Williamson says the competition is between externalist truth-conditional referential semantics (which he favours), and this internalist inferential semantics. He is, like, an expert, of course, but I doubt whether that is the only internalist option.
Related Ideas
Idea 19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
Idea 19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |