more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Inferentialism faces the grave problem of separating patterns of inference that are to count as essential to the meaning of an expression from those that will count as accidental (a form of the analytic/synthetic distinction).
Gist of Idea
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning?
Source
Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.6)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.6
A Reaction
This sounds like a rather persuasive objection to inferentialism, though I don't personally take that as a huge objection to all internalist semantics.
Related Ideas
Idea 19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
Idea 19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |