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Single Idea 19540

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues ]

Full Idea

Much theorizing about justification conflates issues of justified belief with issues of justified/blameless believers.

Gist of Idea

Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers

Source

Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (What is Knowledge-First Epistemology? [2014], p.12)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.12


A Reaction

[They cite Kent Bach 1985] Presumably the only thing that really justifies a belief is the truth, or the actual facts. You could then say 'p is a justified belief, though no one actually believes it'. E.g. the number of stars is odd.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [areas of interest concerning justification]:

If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M]
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady]
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]