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Single Idea 19545

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure ]

Full Idea

One doesn't have to regret everything one knows to be implied by what one regrets. Tom regrets drinking three martinis, but doesn't regret what he knows to be implied by this - that he drank 'something', or that the past is real.

Gist of Idea

We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real

Source

Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.28)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.28

A Reaction

A nice case of analogy! He's right about regret. Perceptual and inferential knowledge have different grounds. To deny inferential knowledge seems to be a denial that modus ponens can be a justification. But MP gives truth, not knowledge.

Related Idea

Idea 16307 Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [are known implications of knowledge also known?]:

20769 Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
19544 Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
19545 We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
19547 Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
19546 Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
19548 The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
19549 P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
19550 We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
6445 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19524 We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
19499 We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
19500 Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
19502 Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]