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Full Idea
One doesn't have to regret everything one knows to be implied by what one regrets. Tom regrets drinking three martinis, but doesn't regret what he knows to be implied by this - that he drank 'something', or that the past is real.
Gist of Idea
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real
Source
Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.28)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.28
A Reaction
A nice case of analogy! He's right about regret. Perceptual and inferential knowledge have different grounds. To deny inferential knowledge seems to be a denial that modus ponens can be a justification. But MP gives truth, not knowledge.
Related Idea
Idea 16307 Don't trust analogies; they are no more than a guideline [Halbach]
| 19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
| 19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
| 19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
| 19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
| 19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
| 19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
| 19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |