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Full Idea
The reality of the past (a 'heavyweight implication') ...is something we know to be implied by things we remember, but it is not itself something we remember.
Gist of Idea
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory
Source
Fred Dretske (The Case against Closure (and reply) [2005], p.35)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.35
A Reaction
If I begin to doubt that the past is real, then I must necessarily begin to doubt my ordinary memories. This seems to be the modus tollens of knowledge closure. Doesn't that imply that the modus ponens was valid, and closure is correct?
| 19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
| 19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
| 19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
| 19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
| 19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
| 19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
| 19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |