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Single Idea 19552

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure ]

Full Idea

Maybe one cannot know the logical consequences of the proposition that one knows, on account of the fact that small risks add up to big risks.

Gist of Idea

We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks

Source

John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 1)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.42

A Reaction

The idea of closure is that the new knowledge has the certainty of logic, and each step is accepted. An array of receding propositions can lose reliability, but that shouldn't apply to logic implications. Assuming monotonic logic, of course.

The 17 ideas from John Hawthorne

14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
14589 A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
14590 If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
14591 Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
15123 Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
15122 Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
15124 If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
15126 Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
15127 A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
15128 We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
15125 We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]