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Full Idea
On my own view, the context sensivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification.
Gist of Idea
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification
Source
Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.81
A Reaction
That sounds right, and it reinforces the idea that 'justification' is a more important epistemological concept than 'knowledge'. 'Am I justified in believing p?' Answer: 'it depends how well you have researched it'.
| 19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
| 19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
| 19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
| 19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
| 19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
| 12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
| 12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
| 12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |