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Full Idea
There are cognitive successes that are not obviously truth related, such as the concepts of making sense of the course of experience, and having found an empirically adequate theory.
Gist of Idea
Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes
Source
Jonathan Kvanvig (Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal [2005], 'Epistemic')
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.361
A Reaction
He is claiming that truth is not the main aim of epistemology. He quotes Marian David for the rival view. Personally I doubt whether the concepts of 'making sense' or 'empirical adequacy' can be explicated without mentioning truth.
| 4421 | Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche] |
| 18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
| 19569 | We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig] |
| 20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
| 19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |