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Full Idea
Chisholm says our fundamental epistemic duties arise from the fundamental duty to (do one's best to) believe the truth and avoid error.
Gist of Idea
We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error
Source
report of Roderick Chisholm (Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977) [1966]) by Jonathan Kvanvig - Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal 'Epistemic'
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.360
A Reaction
Since it strikes me as impossible to perceive something as being true, and yet still not believe it (except in moments of shock), I don't see why we need to introduce dubious claims about 'duty' here. Stupidity isn't a failure of duty.
4421 | Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche] |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
19569 | We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig] |
20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |