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Single Idea 19654

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'.

Clarification

his word 'correlate' means connected to some thinking

Gist of Idea

We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being

Source

Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2)

Book Ref

Meillassoux: 'After Finitude: the necessity of contingency', ed/tr. Brassier,R [Bloomsbury 2008], p.28

A Reaction

He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject.

Related Idea

Idea 19648 Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]

The 25 ideas from Quentin Meillassoux

19648 Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
19649 Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
19651 Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
19647 The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
19652 How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
19654 We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
19653 The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
19658 Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]
19656 Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
19657 In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
19663 We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
19664 Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
19665 Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
19659 The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
19662 It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
19660 Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
19671 The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
19667 If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
19670 Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
19666 If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
19668 Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
19677 What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
19675 Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
19674 The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]