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Single Idea 19654
[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
]
Full Idea
It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'.
Clarification
his word 'correlate' means connected to some thinking
Gist of Idea
We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being
Source
Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2)
Book Ref
Meillassoux: 'After Finitude: the necessity of contingency', ed/tr. Brassier,R [Bloomsbury 2008], p.28
A Reaction
He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject.
Related Idea
Idea 19648
Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
The
25 ideas
from Quentin Meillassoux
19648
|
Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being
[Meillassoux]
|
19649
|
Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality
[Meillassoux]
|
19651
|
Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied
[Meillassoux]
|
19647
|
The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties
[Meillassoux]
|
19652
|
How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans?
[Meillassoux]
|
19650
|
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible
[Meillassoux]
|
19654
|
We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being
[Meillassoux]
|
19658
|
Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist)
[Meillassoux]
|
19653
|
The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind
[Meillassoux]
|
19657
|
In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable
[Meillassoux]
|
19656
|
Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality?
[Meillassoux]
|
19663
|
We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency
[Meillassoux]
|
19664
|
Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts
[Meillassoux]
|
19665
|
Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality
[Meillassoux]
|
19659
|
The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent
[Meillassoux]
|
19662
|
It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist
[Meillassoux]
|
19660
|
Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be
[Meillassoux]
|
19667
|
If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it?
[Meillassoux]
|
19670
|
Why are contingent laws of nature stable?
[Meillassoux]
|
19671
|
The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws
[Meillassoux]
|
19666
|
If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us
[Meillassoux]
|
19668
|
Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow
[Meillassoux]
|
19677
|
What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible
[Meillassoux]
|
19675
|
Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do
[Meillassoux]
|
19674
|
The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality
[Meillassoux]
|