more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 19679
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
]
Full Idea
Strong 'access' internalism says the justification must be accessible to the person holding the belief (for cognitive duty, or blame), and weaker 'mentalist' internalism just says the justification must supervene on mental features of the individual.
Gist of Idea
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification
Source
Jonathan Kvanvig (Epistemic Justification [2011], III)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.31
A Reaction
[compressed] I think I'm a strong access internalist. I doubt whether there is a correct answer to any of this, but my conception of someone knowing something involves being able to invoke their reasons for it. Even if they forget the source.
The
24 ideas
with the same theme
[reasons to favour internalist justifcation]:
|
604
|
Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting'
[Lycophron, by Aristotle]
|
|
2087
|
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror
[Plato]
|
|
2090
|
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark
[Plato]
|
|
4835
|
Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know..
[Spinoza]
|
|
8101
|
To know is to see inside oneself
[Joubert]
|
|
21771
|
Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being
[Hegel]
|
|
8804
|
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence
[Davidson]
|
|
6871
|
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many
[Goldman]
|
|
6872
|
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory
[Goldman]
|
|
6874
|
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence
[Goldman]
|
|
8830
|
A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it
[Goldman]
|
|
8814
|
Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning
[Pollock]
|
|
2749
|
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief
[Dancy,J]
|
|
2770
|
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth
[Dancy,J]
|
|
2739
|
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something
[Audi,R]
|
|
6373
|
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
|
19708
|
Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system
[Foley, by Vahid]
|
|
4724
|
Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
[O'Grady]
|
|
19498
|
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection
[Pritchard,D]
|
|
19679
|
'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification
[Kvanvig]
|
|
19682
|
Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are
[McGrew]
|
|
19705
|
'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access
[Vahid]
|
|
19706
|
Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access
[Vahid]
|
|
19707
|
Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies
[Vahid]
|