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Full Idea
Data do not quite speak for themselves, which speaks against a naive form of falsificationism according to which even the slightest mismatch between theory and evidence suffices to overturn a theory.
Gist of Idea
Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory
Source
Timothy McGrew (Evidence [2011], 'Interp..')
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.63
A Reaction
[He cites Robert Boyle wisely ignoring some data to get a good fit for his graph]
| 19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
| 19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
| 19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
| 19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
| 19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
| 19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
| 19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
| 19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
| 19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
| 19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |