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Single Idea 19698

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes ]

Full Idea

A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.

Gist of Idea

Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed

Source

report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.112

A Reaction

Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [reasons have a distinct causal role in actions]:

5267 Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20042 We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
21363 Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
19615 I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran]
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
19698 Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
9284 Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
6662 We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]
20060 Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
20055 A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
20056 In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]