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Single Idea 19698
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
]
Full Idea
A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
Gist of Idea
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.112
A Reaction
Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[reasons have a distinct causal role in actions]:
5267
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Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing
[Aristotle]
|
20042
|
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
[Aristotle]
|
21363
|
Motivation is causality seen from within
[Schopenhauer]
|
19615
|
I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action
[Cioran]
|
23436
|
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
[Foot]
|
23734
|
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal
[Davidson, by Smith,M]
|
23737
|
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them
[Smith,M on Davidson]
|
6664
|
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
20075
|
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
3395
|
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
19698
|
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed
[Davidson, by Neta]
|
9284
|
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise
[Williams,B]
|
3871
|
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational
[Newton-Smith]
|
20064
|
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control
[Audi,R]
|
6662
|
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
|
19519
|
Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally
[Conee/Feldman]
|
20060
|
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations
[Stout,R]
|
20055
|
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification
[Stout,R]
|
20056
|
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states
[Stout,R]
|
20013
|
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20029
|
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
18684
|
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it
[Orsi]
|