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Single Idea 19699

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem ]

Full Idea

A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.

Gist of Idea

A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck

Source

Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.121


A Reaction

This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [mere true justified belief doesn't ensure knowledge]:

True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell]
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell]
Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier]
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya]
Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya]