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Single Idea 19704
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
]
Full Idea
According to the 'mentalist' version of internalism, an externalist is someone who maintains that two people can be in the same present mental states while one has a justified belief and the other does not.
Gist of Idea
Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications
Source
Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 A)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.145
A Reaction
It seems an unlikely coincidence, that we have identical mental states, but your is (say) reliably created but mine isn't. Nevertheless this does seem to be an implication of externalism, though not a definition of it.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[general issues about external justification]:
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2555
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For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions
[Locke, by Rorty]
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6948
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
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4253
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Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
[Armstrong]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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8812
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Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external
[Pollock]
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8816
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Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology
[Pollock]
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3701
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Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
[Bonjour]
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4258
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Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
[Bonjour]
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2776
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Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
[Dancy,J]
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9382
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Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications'
[Burge]
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3571
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Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
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2738
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Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
[Audi,R]
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4065
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Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
[Crane]
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6370
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
[Pollock/Cruz]
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3755
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Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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4254
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Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification
[Kornblith]
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3568
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Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts?
[Cross,A]
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17723
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Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed
[Jenkins]
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19704
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Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications
[Vahid]
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