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Full Idea
A strong form of 'access internalism' is when an agent is required to be actually aware of the conditions that constitute justification; a weaker version loosens the accessibility condition, requiring only the ability to access the justification.
Gist of Idea
Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access
Source
Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 B)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.146
A Reaction
The super strong version implies that you probably only know one thing at a time, so it must be nonsense. The weaker version has grey areas. I remember roughly the justification, but not the details. The justification is in my diary. Etc.
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| 19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
| 19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
| 19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
| 19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
| 19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
| 19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
| 19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
| 19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |