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Full Idea
Access internalism may also have a truth-conducive conception of justification, where one should not only know what one's reasons are, but also why one's beliefs are probable on one's reasons.
Gist of Idea
Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies
Source
Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 B)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.146
A Reaction
[he cites Bonjour 1985] Sounds reasonable. It would seem odd if you had clear access to the reason, but didn't understand it, because you had just learned it by rote.
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| 19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
| 19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
| 19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
| 19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
| 19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
| 19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
| 19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
| 19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |