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Full Idea
Traditional coherence theories seem unable to account for the role experience plays in justification.
Gist of Idea
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience
Source
Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidence')
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.169
A Reaction
I'm inclined to say that experience only becomes a justification when it has taken propositional (though not necessarily lingistic) form. That is, when you see it 'as' something. Uninterpreted shape and colour can justify virtually nothing.
| 19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
| 19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
| 19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
| 19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |