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Single Idea 19725
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
]
Full Idea
If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem').
Gist of Idea
In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified?
Source
Juan Comesaņa (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.178
A Reaction
That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[objections to reliabilist justification]:
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22326
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Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate
[Russell]
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4259
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External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
[Bonjour]
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2866
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A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion
[Blackburn]
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8890
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If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible
[Bonjour]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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2737
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'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
[Audi,R]
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9162
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Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
[Field,H]
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20187
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Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
[Zagzebski]
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19522
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More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
[Conee]
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19521
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If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
[Conee]
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19523
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Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
[Conee]
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22327
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Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process
[Potter]
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19725
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In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified?
[Comesaņa]
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19726
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How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable?
[Comesaņa]
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19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe
[Kvanvig]
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