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Single Idea 19731

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues ]

Full Idea

Conceiving of the virtues in terms of faculties or powers doesn't help at all with the problem of accounting for propositional knowledge.

Gist of Idea

If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge

Source

Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.204


A Reaction

It always looks as if epistemic virtues are a little peripheral to the main business of knowledge, which is getting beliefs to be correct and well-founded. Given that epistemic saints make occasional mistakes, talk of virtues can't be enough.


The 10 ideas with the same theme [values and qualities need for good justification]:

Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M]