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Full Idea
Conceiving of the virtues in terms of faculties or powers doesn't help at all with the problem of accounting for propositional knowledge.
Gist of Idea
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge
Source
Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.204
A Reaction
It always looks as if epistemic virtues are a little peripheral to the main business of knowledge, which is getting beliefs to be correct and well-founded. Given that epistemic saints make occasional mistakes, talk of virtues can't be enough.
20782 | Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |
23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |