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Full Idea
Conceiving of the virtues in terms of faculties or powers doesn't help at all with the problem of accounting for propositional knowledge.
Gist of Idea
If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge
Source
Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.204
A Reaction
It always looks as if epistemic virtues are a little peripheral to the main business of knowledge, which is getting beliefs to be correct and well-founded. Given that epistemic saints make occasional mistakes, talk of virtues can't be enough.
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
| 19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
| 19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
| 19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
| 19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
| 19261 | Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig] |
| 19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
| 19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
| 19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |