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Full Idea
The Swamping Problem is that the value of truth swamps the value of additional features of true beliefs which are only instrumentally related to them. True belief is no more valuable if one adds a feature valuable for getting one to the truth.
Gist of Idea
The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself
Source
Jonathan Kvanvig (Virtue Epistemology [2011], IV B)
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology', ed/tr. Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D [Routledge 2014], p.206
A Reaction
His targets here are reliabilism and epistemic virtues. Kvanvig's implication is that the key to understanding the nature of knowledge is to pinpoint why we value it so much.
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
| 19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
| 19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
| 19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
| 19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
| 19261 | Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig] |
| 19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
| 19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
| 19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |