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Single Idea 19742

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism ]

Full Idea

Many identify the cognitive with the conscious, and it seems far from plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in these cases. But not every cognitive process, at least on standard usage, is a conscious process.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious

Source

A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §3)

Book Ref

-: 'Analysis' [-], p.3


A Reaction

This gives you two sorts of externalism about mind to consider. No, three, if you say there is extended conceptual content, then extended cognition processes, then extended consciousness. Depends what you mean by 'consciousness'.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [individuation of minds must also refer to externals]:

In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle]
Memory is so vast that I cannot recognise it as part of my mind [Augustine]
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands]
If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers]
Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers]
Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]