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Single Idea 20013
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
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Full Idea
The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position.
Gist of Idea
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
Source
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.1
A Reaction
I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology.
The
15 ideas
from Wilson,G/Schpall,S
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20013
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It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20012
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Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20014
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Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20016
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Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20017
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Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20018
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Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20019
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Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20021
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Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20022
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To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20023
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If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20025
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We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20028
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Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20027
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If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20029
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Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20031
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On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires
[Wilson/Schpall]
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