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Full Idea
Frankfurt says that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of 'acting on a desire with which the agent identifies'.
Gist of Idea
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting
Source
report of Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2
A Reaction
[the cite Frankfurt 1988 and 1999] I'm not sure how that works when performing a grim duty, but it sounds quite plausible.
| 5211 | An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle] |
| 5221 | Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |