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Single Idea 20015

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation ]

Full Idea

Frankfurt says that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of 'acting on a desire with which the agent identifies'.

Gist of Idea

Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting

Source

report of Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2


A Reaction

[the cite Frankfurt 1988 and 1999] I'm not sure how that works when performing a grim duty, but it sounds quite plausible.


The 23 ideas from Harry G. Frankfurt

Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]