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Single Idea 20022

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions ]

Full Idea

If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan.

Gist of Idea

To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned

Source

Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.7


A Reaction

[their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right.

Related Idea

Idea 20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:

Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]