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Single Idea 20029
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
]
Full Idea
Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act.
Gist of Idea
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
Source
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3)
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.11
A Reaction
The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear.
The
15 ideas
from 'Action'
20013
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It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20012
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Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20014
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Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20016
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Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20017
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Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20018
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Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20019
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Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20021
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Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it?
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20022
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To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20023
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If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20025
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We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20028
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Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20027
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If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20029
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Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20031
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On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires
[Wilson/Schpall]
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