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Full Idea
Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
Gist of Idea
Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards
Source
report of Michael Bratman (Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [1987]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 4
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.13
A Reaction
If I thought my belief was a bit warped, and my desire morally corrupt, my higher self might refuse to form an intention. If so, then Bratman is onto something. But maybe my higher self has its own beliefs and desires.
| 20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |