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Single Idea 20041
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
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Full Idea
Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.
Gist of Idea
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting
Source
G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds'
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.15
A Reaction
This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative.
Related Idea
Idea 20044
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:
4380
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Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not
[Burnyeat on Aristotle]
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20041
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Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting
[Anscombe]
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20072
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We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
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20076
|
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
[Davidson]
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20033
|
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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20034
|
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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20169
|
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another
[Kekes]
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23146
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Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions
[Driver]
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20039
|
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
[Stout,R]
|
20044
|
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
[Stout,R]
|
20047
|
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
[Stout,R]
|
20065
|
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
[Stout,R]
|
20067
|
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
[Stout,R]
|
20078
|
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
[Stout,R]
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20023
|
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
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20022
|
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20025
|
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
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