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Single Idea 20042
[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
]
Full Idea
Why is he going for a walk? We say 'to be healthy', and having said that we have assigned the cause.
Gist of Idea
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
Source
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194b33-5)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Physics', ed/tr. Waterfield,Robin [OUP 1996], p.39
A Reaction
Stout gives this as the predecessor of Anscombe's account of intentions. The thought is that the explanation of the act is its purpose. Such teleology is more plausible than the Aristotelian teleology about non-human events.
Related Idea
Idea 20041
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[reasons have a distinct causal role in actions]:
5267
|
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing
[Aristotle]
|
20042
|
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
[Aristotle]
|
21363
|
Motivation is causality seen from within
[Schopenhauer]
|
19615
|
I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action
[Cioran]
|
23436
|
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring
[Foot]
|
23734
|
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal
[Davidson, by Smith,M]
|
23737
|
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them
[Smith,M on Davidson]
|
20075
|
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
6664
|
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
3395
|
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
19698
|
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed
[Davidson, by Neta]
|
9284
|
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise
[Williams,B]
|
3871
|
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational
[Newton-Smith]
|
20064
|
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control
[Audi,R]
|
6662
|
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
|
19519
|
Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally
[Conee/Feldman]
|
20060
|
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations
[Stout,R]
|
20055
|
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification
[Stout,R]
|
20056
|
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states
[Stout,R]
|
20013
|
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20029
|
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
18684
|
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it
[Orsi]
|