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Single Idea 20047

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions ]

Full Idea

In the vast majority of actions you need to look outwards to work out what you should do. An exam invigilator should consult the clock to design when to end the exam, not her state of mind.

Gist of Idea

Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds

Source

Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 3 'The belief-')

Book Ref

Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.39


A Reaction

Stout defends externalist intentions. I remain unconvinced. It is no good looking at a clock if you don't form a belief about what it says, and the belief is obviously closer than the clock to the action. Intellectual virtue requires checking the facts.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:

Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]