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Full Idea
If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
Gist of Idea
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong
Source
Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.83
A Reaction
This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.
Related Idea
Idea 20039 The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
| 7999 | All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)] |
| 24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
| 22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
| 20057 | Philosophy of action studies the roles of psychological states in causing behaviour [Mele] |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| 9759 | Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |