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Single Idea 20065
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
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Full Idea
Should we try to understand what it is to have an intention in terms of what it is to act intentionally, or should we try to understand what it is to have an intention independently of what it is to act intentionally?
Gist of Idea
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
Source
Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Acting')
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.99
A Reaction
Since you can have an intention to act, and yet fail to act, it seems possible to isolate intentions, but not to say a lot about them. Intention may be different prior to actions, and during actions. Early Davidson offered the derived view.
The
34 ideas
from 'Action'
20035
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Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions
[Stout,R]
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20036
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Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act
[Stout,R]
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20039
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The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
[Stout,R]
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20038
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If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant
[Stout,R]
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20044
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The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
[Stout,R]
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20043
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Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual
[Stout,R]
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20049
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Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause
[Stout,R]
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20046
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For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it
[Stout,R]
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20047
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Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
[Stout,R]
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20048
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There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification
[Stout,R]
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20053
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An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you
[Stout,R]
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20052
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If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action
[Stout,R]
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20050
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Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent
[Stout,R]
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20059
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I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events
[Stout,R]
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20058
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Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way
[Stout,R]
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20061
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Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other
[Stout,R]
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20060
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Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations
[Stout,R]
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20055
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A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification
[Stout,R]
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20056
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In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states
[Stout,R]
|
20065
|
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
[Stout,R]
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20073
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Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions
[Stout,R]
|
20068
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Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations
[Stout,R]
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20066
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Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions
[Stout,R]
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20067
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You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
[Stout,R]
|
20069
|
A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on
[Stout,R]
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20070
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An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano
[Stout,R]
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20071
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An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group
[Stout,R]
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20078
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The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
[Stout,R]
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20077
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If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency
[Stout,R]
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20081
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Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle
[Stout,R]
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20083
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Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events)
[Stout,R]
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20079
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Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result?
[Stout,R]
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20080
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If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it?
[Stout,R]
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20084
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Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification
[Stout,R]
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