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Single Idea 20067

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions ]

Full Idea

Intentions are unlike desires. You can simultaneously desire two things that you know are incompatible. But when you form intentions you are embarking on a course of action, and there is a much stronger requirement of consistency.

Gist of Idea

You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent

Source

Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship')

Book Ref

Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.104

A Reaction

I'm not sure why anyone would identify intentions with desires. I would quite like to visit Japan, but have no current intention of doing so. I assume that the belief-plus-desire theory doesn't deny that an uninteresting intention is also needed.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:

4380 Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20041 Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20034 Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20033 Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20169 An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
23146 Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
20039 The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
20044 The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
20047 Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
20065 Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
20067 You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
20078 The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]